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ABSTRACT
How have women fared in unions in recent years? The major findings
of this paper are that unions have been more beneficial for women n the
public sector than in the private sector, and that unionism for women is
primarily a public sector wriite collar phenomenon distinguished from that
of males. According to our analysis:
(1) Women have come to be an increasingly large proportion of trie
unionized work force, and are critical in the one area in
which unions have recently succeeded --thepublic sector.
(2) In the public sector and in white collar occupations where women
unionists are concentrated, unions raise women's wages :nore than
they raise the wages of men.
(3) In the private sector unions have essentially the same effect on
women in wages, turnover, employment and so forth, and do
not deter affirmative action programs to raise female employment.
(4) Comparable worth presents a rare confluence of interests of
unions in search of members, particularly in the public sector,
and women in search of higher wages, and will likely continue
to be used by both especially within the confines of collective
bargaining.
Richard B. Freeman









UNION v1AIOS: UNIONS AND THE FEvIALE 7ORtFORCL
Women have traditionally been less likely to be organized into trade
unions than have en. In 1956, for example, just 15% of female workers
were union members compared to 31% of male workers. Despite union
standard rate wage policies designed to reduce differentials across plants
and to reduce personal differentials within plants, whicn a priori one
would expect to produce a greater union premium for women than for men,
estimates of union wage effects by sex have found no clear pattern of
differentials between men and women. Some unions, notably in construc-
tion, have often been charged with restricting or discouraging women from
entering their trades.
While in decades past when males dominated the labor force unions
could prosper with only limited organization of women, in the 1980's and
into the foreseeable future, women will constitute close to half of the
workforce, making organization of women a key element in any revival of
unionism in the U.S.
How have women fared in anions in recent years? Are women becon'-
ing more organized? What explains the traditionally low proportion of
women in unions? Do unions help or hamper efforts to improve the econo-
inic position of women within organized plants? Are they a positive inter-
vening force in equal opportunity and legal efforts to advance vomens'
rights in the work place?
The basic finding of the paper is that woaen have fared differently
in unions in the public and private sector in recent years.
Section I shows that women are being significantly unionized in the
public sector and that the overall gap in unionization between men and2
women is due largely to differences in the occupations and industries
where men and women work rather tnan to any "innat&' difference in pro-
pensity to unionize.
Section II shows that the widely held view that unions raise the wages
of women by about as much as they raise the wages of men is true for the
private sector and for blue collar workers but is false for the public sector
and for white collar workers, where unionization raises women's wages more
than men's wages. This section also compares termination, promotion,
growth of enployment, and affirmative action activities toward women in
union and nonunion plants in the private sector, finding no noticeable
differences in treatment of women.
Section III analyzes the role of unions in potentially the nost inportant
development affecting female workers in American history: the application
of "comparable worth" to female and male dominated jobs.3
I. Organization of Female Workers
The literature on unionization has long found that women tend to have
lower rates of organization than men, while at the same tine finding little
or no difference in desires for organization between unorganized workers
by sex.l As noted by Fiorito and Greer, however, with rare exception
there have been no empirical studies of unionization of specialgroups as
public sector or white—collar employees,2 who constitute the key to our
analysis of female unionism.
In this section we exanine three indicators of the receptiveness of
women to unionization:(1) the proportion of women who are organized;
(2) the success of unions in NLRB representation elections in female in-
tensive units;(3) opinion poll questions about willingness to vote for
unions in elections or of desires for unions at ones' work place.
Table 1 presents the relevant data on the organization of female and
male workers and the percentage of union workers who are women for the
U.S. from 1956 to 1983. In the total workforce unionists constituted 16%
of the female workers compared to 24% of male workers in 1983. This dif-
ferential, while large, represents a marked change from earlier decades.
Whereas the proportion of male workers in unions has fallen since the mid-
1950s, the proportion of female workers in unions has actually risen, re-
ducing the gap in unionization rates.In conjunction with tne rising pro-
portion of females in the workforce, this has increased the female propor-
tion of union members from 19% (195o) to 41% (1983).
Disaggregation of the work force into public and private employers,
and into white collar and blue collar jobs shows that the increase in female
unionization is a public sector, white collar phenomenon. From 1973 to
1983 the proportion of females organized in the public sector more than
doubled, to attain near equality with the proportion of males organized in4
that sector. Part of the rise for both groups in the public sector repre-
sents, it should be stressed, the change in the role of "associations" in
public employment, as associations such as tiie National Education Associa-
tion have become increasingly involved in collective bargaining. In the
Current Population Survey (CPS) figures in the table, this "switch" occurs
between 1976 and 1979, when the question about union membership was
expanded to include employee associations. While raising the proportion of
"union" in the public sector, the change had oniy a modest effect on the
female ?roportion of unionists.3 In the private sector, by contrast, the
proportion of women organized fell by a quarter, which was smaller than
the near 40% drop in organization among men, but still marked. With res-
pect to "collar" of work, women are as organized as are men among white
collar workers but are less organized. than men among blue collar workers.
Because of female concentration in white collar jobs, however, women con-
stitute 58% of white collar unionists. Among the most important white collar
public sector unions with large female representation are the education
unions (National Education Association, American Federation of Teachers),
American Federation of State, County, and i'.lunicipal Employees; and the
nursing associations in the health care area.
The decline in male-female differences in unionization is explored fur-
ther in Table 2, which records the results of a linear probability equation
for the effect of being female on union status first without and then with
controls for demographic factors and occupation and industry. More pre-
cisely we estimated the following equation:
(1) UNION(4, if yes; =0 if no)= a+b FEMALE (=1, if yes; =0, if no) +
c.X.+d.where X. are the relevant control variables.
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The decline in the female coefficients from —.18 to —.08 between 1973
and 1983 corroborates the picture given in Table 1. With the addition of
a full set of controls, the coefficient of being female falls in half in both
years, producing a 4 point dfference in unionization between men and
women in similar sectors and jobs in 1983.1ore complex analyses, taking
account of size of firm, job tenure and fringe benefits and the like for
the intermediate year 1977, show that over 30 percent of the aale—female
unionization differential is due to workplace differences rather than any
IhinnateTi less desire for unions among wornen.4
Consistent with this, evidence oci the desire for unionization fro:n the
Michigan Quality of Work Survey shows greater preference for unions among
women. In 1977 41% of women workers who were not union tnembers said
they would vote for unions if an NLRB representation election were held at
their place of work compared to 27% of rnen.5 Interpretation of these data is,
however, somewhat complicated. Since more men are organized, one might
expect on the margin a smaller proportion of men than women to want unions,
even if all men and women had the same desire for unions. Analysis of the
desire for unions by Farber shows that after taking account of the propor-
tion of the two groups organized there is no indication of a pure "taste"
differential for unionism by sex.6 Detailed investigation of the attitudes of
women toward unions by Blash using the 1984 AFL-CIO Harris Poll of atti-
tudes shows that only among nonunion public sector white collar workers do
women have a greater belief in the ability of unions to benefit the. than do
men, while among nonunion blue collar private sector workers the two sexes
have similar views —-aresult which we will soon see is consistent with eai—
pirical evidence of actual union effects.7
Finally, evidence on union success in NLRB election campaigns reveals6
that unions do roughly as well or slightly better in female intensive sectors
than in male intensive sectors. In a survey of more than 200 organizing
campaigns that culminated in an NLRB election, the A'L-CIO Department of
Organization and Field Services found that unions won 50% of campaigns in
which women made up 75% or more of the work force (largely in health care
service) compared to 40% of canpaigns in which women made up less than
50% of workforces (largely in manufacturing). 8 While multiple regression
analyses of the success rate show no pure "female" effect on the win rates,
the fact that women are concentrated in the few sectors of union growth
implies a continued rise in the female proportion of unionists. Further
evidence that women have become more receptive to unionization over time is
found in Blash's analysis of the effect of the percentage female on NLkth
representationelection outcomes. Regressing the log of the ratio of workers
wonby unions in NLRBelectionsto employment across industries and time(with
various controls) for the period 1914—1981 she finds the following coefficients
(standard errors) on the percentage women in the industry: —.32 (.08) and on
the interaction of women and time: .03 (.01). This imnlies that unions did
markedly worse in female—intensive industries in the earlier period hut better
in the latter, since the positive interaction dominates the negative main effect
by the end of the period.9
Table3 turns from national data to figures for California, where the
California Department of Industrial Relations has gathered unionization
figures from unions comparable to the now discontinued Bureau of Labor
Statistic national series. The figures show that the proportion of men and
women organized in the private sector, and of rien in the public sector,
have declined but that the proportion of women organized in the public
sector has remained roughly constant. As most "organized'1 workers in7
California were in associations that did not bargain collectively in 1951 while
most were in unions or associations that bargained collectively in 1981, the
public sector figures underestimate the rise in effective unionization
there.1O As a result of the changing unionization of men and women, the
figures on percentage of union (association) workers who are female rises
from about a quarter to nearly a third. In terms of the public/private
sector break, by 1981 women constituted 39% of union and association iiem-
bers in goveriinent in California, compared to 28% of union members in
manufacturing.
All told, the evidence for the most recent years shows a striking
change in unionization among women which, together with data on prefer-
ences and voting, indicates that women will no longer be one of the least
unionized demographic groups in the U .S.The new unionization of women
is, however, quite different from traditional unionization of men.It is
white collar public sector unionism, and as such as limited to one segment
of the overall work force. As yet, outside of health care and a few
selected private sector industries, there has been no breakthrough in
unionizationof women inthe private sector.8
II. What Unions do to Female Wages and Employment
How hariiful or helpful have unions been to the wage and employment
interests of women workers? In the political sphere, the AFL—CIO has often
joined with women's groups and others in coalitions to press for certain
types of legislation. In the workplace, the situation has in years past been
more complex, with some unions having policies that help female workers
and others policies that are harmful. To determine the impact of unionism
on female wages and employment, we examine two sets of data: national
Current Population Survey statistics on the usual hourly earnings of woi-ien
and men; and data on employment in California manufacturing establish-
rxients.Our findings on wages overturn the traditional conclusion that
unionism has similar wage effects on female as on male wages. Our findings
on employment reject the notion that because of discrimination or seniority
rules (which are thought to benefit men more than women because men are
more likely to have greater seniority) women fare more poorly in unionized
settings. Finally, we examine the role of unions as an intervening institu-
tion in affirmative action and find no significant union effect on the success
of affirmative action in altering female employment.
The Wage Evidence
In his recent summary of extant evidence on the differential effect of
unionism Lewis surveyed 48 studies dealing with the impact of inions on
female as opposed to male wages and concluded that in the 1967-1979 period
covered "the numerical magnitude of the difference (in estimated union
effects on men and women) is close to zero. "11 Table 4 presents a summary
of the data which leads Lewis to this conclusion.
The problem with the studies cited by Lewis is not that they have9
erred in their "regression models" but that they have ignored the public
sector where women unionists predominate and have focused on all workers
or blue collar workers rather than on white collar workers where worrien
are organized. Given our findings tiat female unionization is a public
sector and white collar phenomenon, this is obviously not the appropriate
way to determine what unions do to female wages, other factors fixed.
Accordingly, we have analyzed the effect of unions on female and male
earnings by sector and collar" of work, using the standard log-linear
earnings function.
Table 5 presents our basic results in terms of the estimated coeffi—
dents O1 unionism. For the private sector our results are consistent with
the studies cited by Lewis: no discernible difference in union wage effects
by sex. For the public sector, however, we find a sizeable significant
difference in 1983, with unions raising female wages more than Lnale wages,
and a moderate differential favoring females in 1973. The only other study
which we have identified as dealing with public sector union wages effects
by sex reports a similar pattern, with unions having a greater effect on
female than male wages in government employment. 12 The wnite collar-blue
collar decomposition in Table S shows an even more dramatic picture, with
unions raising the wages of blue collar male and female workers by about
the same amount but having much greater impact on the wages of white
collar females than of white collar males. 13 We conclude that in tne areas
where female unionization is large and growing unions do, hifact,raise
wages more for women than for men.
To see whether the union effect on women's wages among public sec-
tor and white collar workers is largely due to industrial or occupational
factors, we have further decomposed the data by collar and sector. Jhile10
the samples are too small to oake any definitive statement, the calculations
in Table 6 suggest that both collar and sector affect the union differential
by sex: we obtain notably greater union effects on female pay for all cate-
gories but blue collar workers in the private sector.
Our results do not, however, imply that unionization reduces tie
male—female pay gap in the economy as a whole. The effect of unions on
the economy-wide gap depends not only on the union impact on wages
within groups but on the proportion of men and women organized in these
groups. If, as is the case, male unionists are concentrated in the sector
with the greatest union premium (blue collar private sector workers) then
unionism could raise their wage in the economy as a whole more than it
raises the wage of women, exacerbating the male—female pay gap.
We estimate the impact of unionization on the overall nale-fernale pay
gap by taking weighted averages of the figures in Table 6 to obtaiu aver-
age union effects on the wage bill for each sex, assuming no spillover ef-
fects:
(2) W. = .Aw..
1 31] 1)
where =averagepercentage point effect of uniornsm on wages for the
i'th sex in jth sector
=ratioof union workers of i'th sex in sector jtototal
workersof itth sex.
The results, given below, show that unionism hasan insubstantial ef-




Among union members, the average union wageeffectis still larger for
women (.19) than for men (.17). However, in the calculation above this is
more than balanced by the greater proportion of men (.24) than of women
(.16) who are union members. On net unions raise the male wage bill
slightly more than that of females, despite the greater union wage effect for
women.
The Employment Evidence: Private Sector
Turning to employment, we have examined the effect of unionism on
turnover and employment growth and on the impact of affirmative action in
California establishments. Our findings on employment are consistent with
those in tne private sector on wages; we find that unions have similar ef-
fects on women as on men, and do not impair the workings of affirmative
action in altering employment patterns.
Table 7 summarizes the results of an analysis of the effect of unions
on turnover and growth of employment by sex and ethnic group. The
estimates are based on regression analysis of the specified turnover variables
separately for each group on whether a plant is or is not covered by collec-
tive bargaining and a host of control variables as specified in the table
note. As can be seen, the principal finding is that unions have no statis-
tically significant effect on turnover or employment share growth across
demographic groups. Indeed, the only marginally significant impact is for
union plants to promote blacks more than other groups. In particular,there is no significant evidence here that union seniority rules have worked
to the detriment of ninrities or females.
To examine the effects of unionism on the ability of affirmative action
to increase female employment we have analyzed the effect of contract com-
pliance and contract review on the growth of the female share of the work
force in union and nonunion establishment in California. The test is based
on a sample of 1273 California establishments described in Leonard (1983).
These are log-odd estimates weighted by the establishments total blue collar
employment. The dependent variable is the logarithm of PI(1-P),whereP
is a given demographic group's share of share of blue collar employment in
1980. This is regressed on 1974 employment share, two or three digit SIC
industry, SMSA, establishment size and growth, proportion craft workers,
and a control for whether the establishment was part of a multi—plant cor-
poration. Of particular interest here, controls are also included for wne-
ther or not the establishment was part of a federal contractor company
obligated to pursue affirmative action under executive order 11246, for
whether or not the establishment experienced an affirmative action com-
pliance review between 1974 and 1980, and for the interactions of contractor
and review status with union status. Our test of the intervening role of
unions on affirmative action for females is whether or not the interaction
terms in the female equations are significant. The results of this calcula-
tion given in Table 8 show no significant union effect. Indeed these data
indicate that the white and black female share of employment (but not trie
Hispanic female share) grew more in unionized than in nonunion California
plants in the 1974-1980 period covered. While some might hold union plants
to a higher standard, during this period whatever unions did at work
places in the private sector did not deter female employment nor the opera-
tion of affirmative action.13
Conclusion: The Puzzle
The evidence given here suggests that unions have done el1 for wo-
men in general and have done better for women than for men in the public
sector but not in the private sector. Why the difference? At this stage of
our research we cannot provide a definite answer. Since, as we have seen,
unionization reduces male-female wage gaps among blue collar as well as
white collar labor in the public sector, we believe the answer does not lie
in differences in the types of workers organized by sex in the public
ctnr -
Indeed,in one sense the puzzle of our results (and of the earlier
work cited by Lewis) is why the union wage premium is not greater for
blue collar women in the private sector, given policies of standardization of
rates, promotion by seniority, explicit anti—discrimination clauses in con-
tracts, and the like.
There are three possible explanations:
(1) That blue collar women work in different industries than blue
collar men —-inapparel and garments rather than autos and
steel ——andthat union power is less in the predominately fe-
male industries, counterbalancng any tendency to reduce male-
female differentials at work places.
(2) That blue collar women are so occupationally segregated from
blue collar men that it is the effect of unions on occupational
differentials (which varies greatly) rather than on personal dif-
ferentials that dominates the statistics.
(3) That, despite explicit wage policies, unions are unable to alter
male—female pay differentials at given work places.
The first of these hypotheses suggests analyses of union effects on14
wage differentials within detailed industries and of the relation between
the level of pay by industry and enp1oyment of male and fenale mionists
at industry levels niore detailed than those held fixed in our calculations.
The second suggests analysis of occupational segregation and wages within
specific sectors. The third suggests investigation of gaps between ex-
pressed and actual union policies in the private sector.15
III. Corparable Worth
Despite equal pay legislation, Equal Enployment Opportunity and Af-
firinativeAction, women in the U. S. continue to earn noticeably less than
men even after account is taken of differences in human capital, as mea-
sured by years of work experience, tenure, education, and the like. As
can be seen below, other countries have done a much better job in
the relative earnings of women in the 1970s:l5
Average Hourly Earnings of Women Workers As Percentage of Those of ien
1970 1981/82 Change
Australia 65 86 21
Sweden 80 90 10
UnitedKingdom 60 70 10
Italy 74 84 10
Westermany 69 73 4
United States 62 65 3
In this section we examine the development of "comparable worth" in
the United States, efforts to improve the economic position of women, anci
the role of unions in pressing for comparable worth, and then speculate
about its potential impact on male/female earnings dfferentials in the econ-
omy.
The Doctrine and Unions
The doctrine of comparable worth --equalpay for comparable work --
canbe seen as an historical outgrowth of the confrontation of the movement
for equal employment by women with the fact that most women workers are
concentrated in female dominated occupations beyond the purview of the
Equal Pay Act of 1963. As an active federal policy, pay equity for women
can be traced back at least as far as the War Labor i3oard of World War II.16
The oard and its agents commonlyadjudicatedwage disputes and altered
inequitable wage schedules within plants, and soon developed the principle
that men and women in different jobs within a plant that required the same
skill, effort and responsibility deserved equal pay.16 With the easing of
wartime pressures, direct federal intervention in wage setting declined, as
did the prominence of women in traditionally male jobs in manufacturing.
The issue of pay equity for women was not again the direct object of feder-
al policy until passage of the Equal Pay Act (EPA) in 1963 as an amend-
ment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The EPA is chiefly of interest
because of a curious history in which it has threatened, through the Ben-
nett Amendment to Title VII, to hobble the application of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to gender wage discrimination cases. While the
EPA provides administrative requirements and remedies that are often pre-
ferable to those of Title VII to plaintiffs, its application is limited to equal
pay for equal --notcomparable --work.17
This limitation to cases of equal work is a crucial one because of oc-
cupational segregation -theconcentration of most women in female intensive
jobs, or in female only jobs where the EPA cannot be applied. Madden
(1975) states that "the main employment disadvantage of women is their
unfavorable occupational distribution"18 and Oaxaca (1973) concludes that
"unequal pay for equal work does not account for very much of the male-
female wage differential. itather it is the concentration of women in rela-
tively low-paying occupatons and lower status jobs even within the higher
paying occupation groups. "19 Clearly, the importance of occupational segre-
gation in determining the wage gap depends on how narrowly occupations
are defined. Nevertheless, to achieve pay equal to that of men, women
essentially have had two avenues open: (1) achieve the same jobs as r.ien17
or, (2) gain pay equal to that of men in comparable jobs. The remainder
of this section wifl examine the historical role played by unions and by Title
VI in womens' progress along these avenues, particularly the second.
In attempting to use unions as a vehicle to gain traditionally male
dominated jobs, wo1nen have legal recourse to both Title Vu and to the
NLRA. The courts have long held that along with the right of exclusive
representation unions must also bear the responsibility of fair representa-
tion.20 While the court has held (in Alexanaer v. Gardner-Denver Co.)
that a union may not circumscribe an employee's opportunity to seek relief
under Title 7Il, it has also held (in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western
Addition Community Organization) that subgroups of employees (such as
minorities or females) cannot circumvent their elected representatives to
engage in direct bargaining with their employer over issues of employment
discrimination.Justice Douglas, in dissent, argued tnat tnis judgment
made union members prisoners of the union, but that may well be one cost
of maintaining a system of collective bargaining.21 Furthermore, as ard—
ner—Denver makes clear the walls of the "prison" are not impervious,
because individuals maintain the right to bring suit under Title VII.
Aoreover, the union itself has a duty not to discriminate in its own
practices22, and may be liable for employer discrimination engaged in ?ur-
suant to a collective bargaining contract. In the case of Local Union No.
12, United Rubber Workers of America v. NLRB, 1966, the courts held that
a union implicated in discrimination with an employer by a collectively
bargained agreement must propose specific contractual provisions to prohibit
discrimination.23 Bargaining orer the elimination of race or sex discrimina-
tion is a mandatory subject of bargaining, so an employer is subject to bad
faith bargaining charges if he refuses to bargain with the union in this18
area.24 These rights and responsibilities under NLRA law have profound
implications that are slowly developing in decisions of the NLR3 and the
courts. Perhaps of greatest import, recent decisions under the NLRA have
established legal tools that unions are in a unique position to use to un-
cover and eliminate Jiscrirnination. The IUE, represented by Winn ewman,
led in many of these pathbreaking cases. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 239
NLRB106 (1978) established that the employer, as part of the duty to
bargain, must tell an inquiring union the race and gender breakdown of all
its employees and of its promotions.25 Knowledge is power. In this case
the union has access to knowledge that is generally denied to an individual
worker. This is a key to understanding the confluence of interests of
feminists and unionists. Newman and Vonhof (p. 319) have outlined tile
uses to which such knowledge may be put:
"The union may use the data to negotiate a new collective bar—
gaining agreement, to administer an existing agreement, or to
protect the rights of its members by filing complaints of discri'n—
ination with government agencies or courts. Armed with such
information and ability to obtain additional information from their
members and their knowledge of past company practices, unions
stand in an excellent position to identify discrimination which
may otherwise have gone unrecognized by affected employees.
Unions also are able to inform affected workers about their rights
and to asset them in bringing complaints before the proper author-
ites.Moreover, as several courts have recognized, unions can
contribute immeasurably to the effectiveness of fair enploynent
litigation through their ability to offer financial support, know-
ledge of the plant, technical expertise, and moral support to plain-
tiffs who are union members." (emphasis added)
Indeed, one of the most notable recent developments in industrial rela-
tions is that women have developed a wider appreciation of the usefulness
of collective bargaining, while at the same time many unions have increasing-
ly acknowleged the importance of womea.26 This confluence of interests
holds with particular strength in the female intensive public sector, where
fears of male backlash may he reduced.19
Coalition of Labor Union Women President Joyce Miller has stated "We
in the labor movement know that the fastest way for women to gain economic
equality is to join a union. Women join unions for the same reasons men
do: better pay, better benefits and job security" (CLUW News 8:4 July!
August 1983). The drive by women for pay equity finds a remarkable echo
within certain unions, AFSCME and the IUE in particular. These are not
always the unions with the greatest proportion or larest number of women
members, but they are the unions that appear to be in closest alignment
with CLUW's goals. For example, the 1980 Proceedings of the 19th Consti-
tutional Convention of the IUE (p. 61) states the case plainly:
"Hiring more female and minority organizers is good for affirmative
action.It is also good for unions and good for organizing. The in-
creasing number of women entering the work force means that today's
biggest organizing potential is among women and minorities.If unions
are to succeed in their current organizing efforts, it is critical to have
more women and minorities as organizers. This is not only morally
right, but it complies wth the IUE's policy calling for greater participa-
tion of women and minorities in the union."
It is worth considering why Newman and Vonhof (p. 317) can conclude
that "Both sides of the pay equity deoate, consequently, agree that im-
mediate initiatives will not come from the government, but from private
plaintiffs and labor unions. "26 The answer turns on the development of and
prospects for comparable worth under Title VII law.
Union Pay Equity Suits under Title VII Law
It is not surprising, in light of the position of unions outlined above,
that unions have been in the forefront of pay equity suits under Title VII,
and of comparable suits.
The first pay equity lawsuit under Title VII was probably that fileu by
the IUE more than 13 years ago in the case of Rinehard v. Westinghouse20
Elec Corp., No. 70-537 (N.D. Ohio 1979), which resulted in backpay
awards through a 1977 out—of—court settlement. Success in such cases was
severely limited however because several courts held that the application of
Title VII to gender wage discrimination cases was limited to the restrictive
equal work standard of the EPA.
Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
sex ..."TheBennett Amendment to Title VII, however, provides:
"It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this suo
chapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex
in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or
to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation
is aathorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title 29" (tne
EPA).
Some courts had interpreted this to mean that in the case of gender
wage discrimination, the EPA, entering by way of the Bennett Amendment,
would swallow Title VII, and eliminate the application of Title VII to cases
of non-equal work where the EPA does not apply. This theory was rejected
by the Supreme Court in 1981 in its important decision in County of Wast-
ington v. Gunther 452 U.S. 161 (1981). However, it is important to realize
that while Gunther did not slam shut the door to comparable worth claims
under Title VII, it opened that the door a only crack, and it took great
pains to disavow being a decision on comparable worth.28
we do not decide in this case how sex—based wage discrimination
under Title VII should be structured.... Respondents' claim is not
based on the controversial conception of 'comparable worth' ...Rather
respondents seek to prove, by direct evidence, that their wages were
depressed because of intentional sex discrimination, consisting of setting
the wage scale for female guards, but not for male guards, at a level
lower than its own survey of outside markets and the worth of the
jobs warranted" .29
The courts have been reluctant to become enmeshed in wage-setting,although there are limits beyond which employers become liable. On the
one hand JUE v. Westinghouse (1980) Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (2 Fair Emp.
Prac. Cas.) 588 (3d. Cr., 1980), denied certiorari by the Supreme court in
1981, held in a case involving different jobs that deliberately discriminatory
wage classifications and segregated jobs are illegal. As Judge Higginbotham
put it:
"The statuory issue here is whether Congress intended Westing-
house to willfully discriminate against wonen in a way in wnich
it could not discriminate against ...anyother group protected by the Act."
On the other hand, as Juage Rehnquist noted in his dissent, tne
Gunther decision left untouched lower court decisions against the doctrine
of comparable worth in Lemons v. City and County of Denver, and in
Christianson v. Iowa. In addition, the post-Gunther decision in Plemer v.
Parsons—Gilbane, 713 F. 2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983) refused to engage in a
direct comparison of overlapping but unequal jobs. At the same titie, the
EEOC has yet to pursue a comparable worth charge, take a public position,
or issue guidelines.At best, the ?rospects for pursuing gender wage
discrimination charges in unequal jobs are unclear.
The recent celebrated decision iI AFSCME v. State of Washington,
while heralded as a comparable worth case, may be seen as falling within
the narrower confines of Gunther: the employer had studied salaries,
determined the worth of somewhat different jobs held by wonen and men,
yet had continued to pay a lower wage in proportion to worth for the
"women's" job.In fact, Justice Tanner called it a straightforward "failure
to pay" case. In his opinion the court was not required to make a subjec-
tive assessment as to the comparable worth of the jobs involved, because
the state had already done so: "The state has failed to rectify an acknow—22
ledged discriminatory disparity in compensation. 3Q To some extent, manage-
ment tied its own noose in these cases. In reaction to the Washington
decision, one state legislator thought that states might be "hesitant to
conduct studies and collect the data that could then be used against the
state in a lawsuit." AFSCME, on the other hand, hoped that public em-
ployers would be wore willing to negotiate, rather than meet in court.
Eleanor Norton of the National Council of the Future of Women in the Work
Place and former EEOC chair, has stated that success in the public sector
is discouraging job evaluation studies by private sector employers. Where
management has not tied itself to a comparable worth study, the courts
have left it unclear just how far, or in what manner gender wage discrimina-
tion cases may proceed.
There is one :iajor sector in which management has commonly tied itself
to formal job evaluation schemes, in which women make up a substantial
proportion of the employees, and in wnich unions have mane substantial
organizing gains in recent years. These three factors are not unrelated.
A leading Title VII defense lawyer, thruce Nelson, has stated that "public
employers seem to be more vulnerable to the equity argument than private
employers" and that "if I were going to prove this legal theory [of corn-
parable worth], I would sue municipalities all the time. "31 These public
sector employers are particularly vulnerable because they are typically
committed to both (1) a merit pay system and (2) a puolic obligation to
perform job evaluation studies in defense of their pay system.32 In addi-
tion, they typically employ large numbers of women, and have recently been
opened to unionization.
AFSCME, along with a few other unions, have has been quick to seize
the initiative in such cases, both in the courts and with less public fan—23
fare, but perhaps greater results, at the bargaining table., The first
strike mainly over comparable worth issues, was by AFSCME in San Jose,
California in 1981. This has been followed by negotiated pay equity adjust-
ments and litigation in a growing number of state and local governments.
At the state level, AFSCME and other unions have pressed for comparable
worth studies, followed by wage schedule adjustments in the course of
collective bargaining.At least 18 states, including among others states
Minnesota, California, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Kansas, New York,
Oregon, and West Virginia, nave come under such pressure. The state
level of government has become quite important in tnis area. Siniscalio and
Remmers (1984) report that Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia are among the states that
have adopted legislation prohibiting all employers from paying women less
than men for comparable work, and that California, Minnesota, Montana,
and Washington have passed sucn legislation covering only state government
employees. Part of the future effects of a national policy of comparable
worth could presumably be judged from the current experience of these
states.
In pursuing this course, the challenge women face is reminiscent of
the "Gilded Ghetto" dilemma urban blacks faced in the 1960s. Then, with
some resignation in the face of great difficulties in acnieving racial resi-
dential integration, attention turned instead toward improving conditions in
the ghetto, which in turn reduces the incentive to leave the ghetto. In the
face of difficulties and delays in applying Title VII and affirmative action to
achieve gender occupational integration, attention has shifted toward im-
proving conditions in the clerical and service "ghetto.'t But as Phyllis24
Wallace (p. 11) has noted, "In the final analysis the shifting of women
workers out of the female—dominated occupations to the higher-paying jobs
in the predominantly male occupations would tend to raise wages for women.
An adjustment of wages in the predominantly female occupations (sex-segre-
gated) may be difficult to achieve."
Given the changing political climate (the Department of Justice may
challenge AFSCME v. State of Washington) and the prospect of a more con-
servative cast to the Supreme Court, a number of womens' groups have
seen that there is an existing alternative to fighting for comparable worth
in the U .S. Congress or under Title VII in the courts. That alternative is
collective bargaining.It has long been established under the NLA that
unions may, in the course of collective bargaining, set wages without any
legally required reference to market wages or to any external standard
whatsoever. We are currently seeing that where there are enough current
or potential women union members relative to men, many unions, which have
always had at their core some notion of pay equity, will pursue equal pay
for comparable worth in collective bargaining. They may have little choice if
they are to continue to succeed in the only sector in wnich they have made
substantial organizing gains in recent years:the public sector.
What Comparable Worth ivlay Do
Assume that comparable worth does indeed succeed in cxianging the
structure of pay by occupation through court decisions or collective bar-
gaining.Will it prove to be an economic whirlwind "costing untold rthllions"25
or will it prove tobea fruitful remedy to longstanding male-female pay in-
equity? Most economists, it is safe to say, would bet on the whirlwind,
expecting an exogenous change in the structure of pay to produce great
loss of jobs and economic misery in affected sectors. As empiricists, we
are hesitant to predict the future. The main reason for the dramatic 21
point increase in the female to male pay ratio in Australia from 1970 to 1931
was the implementation of comparable worth in that economy. Contrary to
fears of many, Australian women have not been disemployed in larger num-
ber, nor has the Australian economy suffered great dislocation.33 Recent
estimates of what comparable worth might do to the U.S. occupational wage
structure suggest a surprisingly modest decline in male/female wage differ-
entials, which should Tisoothe the fears of comparable worth opponents who
view it as trie worst idea since irlinimum wage legislation."34f\T Conclusion
In past decades unions, like the rest of labor market actors, could
treat women workers cursorily, as secondary labor with no strong attach-
inent to the workplace. Except for a few limited industries and occupations
the role of women in the work place was not critical to unions' success.
The situation in the 1980s is quite different.
According to our analysis:
(1) Women have come to be an increasingly large proportion of the
unionized work force, and are critical in the one area in
which unions have recently succeeded -—thepublic sector.
(2) In the public sector and in white collar occupations where women
unionists are concentrated, unions raise women's wages more than
they raise the wages of 'nen.
(3) In the private sector unions have essentially the same effect on
women in wages, turnover, employment and so forth, and do
not deter affirmative action programs to raise female employ-
ment.
(4) Comparable worth presents a rare confluence of interests of
unions in search of members, particularly in the public
sector, and worien in search of higher wages, and will likely
continue to be used by both especially within the confines of
collective bargaining.27
NOTES
1.See Fiorito and Greer, Vos.
2.Fiorito andGreer, p. 15.
3.Our tabulations show for thepublicsector 31.6% of men organized in
1976compared to 38.0% in 1977 and 21.2% of women organized in 1976
compared to 28.4% in 1977. Thefemale proportion of public sector
employees rose from 40.6% to 43.9%between the two years.
4.R. Freeman and J. Medoff, What do Unions do? (a'sic ooks), p. 2.
Also see Mellow, Antos and Chandler.
5.Freeman and Medoff, op. cit., p. 29.
6.H. Farber, '1The Determination of Union Status of Workers," National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Nuwber 1006 (October
1984).
7.Linda Blash, Can Women Save the Unions? Undergraduate research,
Harvard University, 1985.
8.AFL-CIO Department of Organization and Field Services, iFL—CI3
Organizer Survey (April 1, 1984), p. 18.
9.Linda Blash, op. cit.as
10. California introduced a collective bargaining law for teachers and a
meet and confer law for state and local workers in the period.
11. H.G. Lewis, Union Relative Wage Effects: A Survey (University of
Chicago Press, forthcoming), chapter 7, p. 10 of draft.
12. S.Smith, ual Pay in the Public Sector:Fact or Fantasy?
(Princeton, 1977), p. 124.
13. J. Antos, "Union Effect on White Collar Compensation," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review 36 (1983), pp. 461-479, also reports a
bigger effect for women than rren among white collar workers.
14. In our data tabulated from the May 1983 CPS,,theproportion of
all workers of a given sex who are unionized and in a given sector
are:
female male
Private Sector White Collar .039 .03
Private Sector Blue Collar .038 .131
Public Sector White Collar .074 .048
Public Sector Blue Collar .010 .027
Proportion Union .161 .242
(columns iaay not sun because of rounding)
15. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Working
Paperon The Role of Women in the Economy, Women and their
Integration in the Economy (3 May 1984, p. 76).Usual Weekly
Earnings,Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1984,Table 716.
16.See general Order 16, November 24, 1942. 24 War Lab. Rep. (BN),29
xii, which authorized "adjustments which equalize the wage or salary
rates paid to males for comparable quality and quantity of work on the
same or similar operation.In practice a more restrictive equal work
policy may have prevailed. In Rotary Cut Box Indust. 12 War Lab.
Bd. Rep. (1984) the Board stated "This doctrine is not to be invoked
to abolish wage differentials between jobs which have historically been
performed by women entirely and jobs which have been recognized in
the industry as jobs limited for the most part to men.: As Cabin
(1979, p. 9) argues, this distinction may have been shaped by the
expectation that men would replace women in the traditionally male jobs
after the war.
17. The basic prohibition states:
(1) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of tnis
section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which sucri
employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by
paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than
the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in
such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are per-
formed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is
made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a
system viuich measures earnings by quantity or quality of production;
or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other tnan sex. Provid-
ed, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential hi viola-
tion of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with tue provisions
of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
The EPA also forbids unions "to cause or attempt to cause ... an
employer to discriminate .. ." (29U .S. C. 26d), although unions rnone—
tary liability is unclear.(See Denicula v. G.C. Murphy Co., 562 F.
Zd 889 (3d Cir. 1977) and Northwest Airlines nc. v. Transport Work-
ers Union,451 U.S.77.88—89 n20 (1981).30
18. Madden, 1975.
19. Oaxaca 1973.
20. See for example the cases of Steele v. Louisville, and Vaca v. Sipes.
21. See LI. Case v. NLR 1944, and Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 1966.
22. See Handy Andy, Inc. 2977 and NLRB v. Iansion House 1973.
23. The extent of union liability and responsibility in such cases is open
to question. See D. Sion (1980) and a "Union Liability for Employer
Discrimination," Harvard Law Review.
24. Farmers Cooperative Compress, U.S. 903, 1969.
25.See also I.U.E. v. 1'LRB, F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1980), 105 Lab. e1.
Rep.(BNA) (L.R.R.v1) 337 (1980) and IUE v. NLRB, R. 2d.
(D.C.C., 1980), 106 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (L.R.R.M.) 3341 (1980).
26. Woren are still rarely found among the top leadership of national
unions. In 1982, 16 labor organizations appear to be led by women.
Mostof these organizations were small public sector unions.
27. The emphasis here is not on channelling all pay equity energies into
collective bargaining, but rather into collective bargaining in conjunc-3'
tin with the threat of Title VII litigation. As Newman and Wilson
(1981, p. 324) state, "...theIUE has recognized that discrimination
will generally not be corrected at the bargaining table, at least not
without using the law for support.:
28. To appreciate the narrowness of the Gunther decision, consider the
following extract:
"Petitioner argues strenuously that the approach of the Court of
Appeals places 'the pay structure of virtually every employer and the
an 4-4..atin r.n rsrv,-.r a +rci,., inc, ,1- 4 n n+ 4-n or. -..s i4- in -.,In-. — + In ,- A —. 1
L_LiAL '.J iS_flLi. . . a s *ar LiLi %e'a. IJJ ',I.LS_ L- S LA L. LiiyLI y Lii A. C¼A.C A.0.1
courts.'...Respondents contend that the County of Washington èval-
uated the worth of their jobs; that the country determined that they
should be paid approximately 95% as much as the male correctional
officers; that it paid them only about 70% as much, while paying the
male officers the full evaluated worth of their jobs; and that the fail-
ure of the county to pay respondents the full evaluated worth of their
jobs can be proven to be attributable to intentional sex discrimination.
Thus, respondents' suit does not require a court to nake its own sub-
jective assessment of the value of the male and female guard jobs, or
to attempt by statistical technique or other method to quantify the ef-
fect of sex discrimination on the wage rates. We do not decide in this
case the precise contours of lawsuits challenging sex discrimination
under Title VII.It is sufficient to note that respondents' claims of
discriminatory undercompensation are not barred by K703(h) of Title
VI merely because respondents do not perform work equal to tnat of
male jail guards."
(Zimmer, p. 616)
29. Zirnmer et al., p. 6Q9
30. BNA DL 12/15/23pD—8,9.
31. Bruce Nelson, quoted in Newman and Wilson.
32. 219 of the 226 comparable worth charges pending before the EEOC
as of June 1982 were against municipalities, according to the statement32
ofClarence Thomas, EEOC Chair, before House Committee on Post
Jfficeand Civil Service, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 374, 393 (1982).
33. See R. Gregory and R. Duncan (19i). The growth rateoffemale
employmentmay have slowed in the Australian private sector, but not
inthe public sector.
34. eorge Johnson and Gary Solon, 11Pay Differences between Women's
and Men's Jobs: The Empirical Foundations of Comparable Worth
Legislation," N'ER Working Paper No. 1472, September 1984.For
larger estimates see Robert Buchele and Mark Aldrich, 1985.33
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Table 1: Organization of Workers, by Sex, in USA, 1956-1983
Percentage Organized 1956 1966 1973 1980 1983
Total Work Force
Female 14.9 12.6 15.9
14.5 16.7 16.1
Male 31.0 29.7 30.8
32.7 30.3 24.2
Public Sector
Female 17.3 32.3 38.1
Male 28.0 38.8 39.2
Private Sector
Female 13.6 12.0 9.8
Male 33.4 28.4 20.6
White Collar
Female 10.4 15.6 15.8
Male 11.4 17.5 15.9
Blue Collar
Female 21.0 19.1 16.7
Male 44.8 39.6 33.3
Percentage of Union
Workers who are Female
Total 18.5 19.3 25.0
23.7 31.7 40.7
Public - 36.7 47.3 46.7
Private - 20.9 25.0 32.2
White Collar - 44.3 54.6 58.2
Blue Collar - 17.2 18.4 23.9
Source:1956-1973 from Linda LeGrande, uWomen in Organizations: Their
N umbers are Increasing," U.S. Department of Labor, Monthly Labor
Review, August 1978, pp. 8-14. These data are from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics Survey of Unions. The 1973 figures are an average
of 1972and1974.
1973-1983,tabulated from May Current Population Surveys. These
data are from the reports of households.
Note: 1973 data limited to union membership, 1980 and 1983 data relate to
union and employee association.40
Table 2: Effect of Being Female on Probability of Being Union Workers
Coefficient and Standard Error
1973 1983
1.With female as sole factor -.18 (.005) -.08(.008)
2.With other demographic controls -.18 (.005) -.08(.007)
3.With industry and occupations controls -.09 (.005) -.04(.008)
Source:Based on linear probability regression analysis of Current Population
Surveydata, May 1973 and May 1983.
Sample size in 1973 was 35479
Sample size in 1983 was 11212; in this year the CPS union question
was administered to only part of the overall sample.41




Female .26 .24 .19
Male .51 .46 .32
Public Sector
Female .35 .38 .35
Male .62 .60 .50
Manufacturing
Female .35 .32 .22
Male .42 .42 .28
Trade
Female .13 .12 .12
Male .24 .22 .17
Services
Female .11 .11 .07
Male .11 .09 .05
Utility & Transportation
Female .47 .49 48
Male .81 .76 .65
Percentage of Union or
Association Workers who
are Female
Total .24 .24 .31
Public .26 .32 .39
Private .19 .22 .27
Source:Union membership from "Union Labor in California," California
Department of Industrial Relations. Association Members from
"Independent State and Local Public Employers Association in
California, 1979.11 California Department of Industrial Relations,
extrapolated.42
Table4: Summary of Studies of Union Wage Effects by Sex, from Lewis
Data Set (Number of Studies) Mean Estimates of Union Effect on
Male Minus Union Effect on Females
Current Population Survey (25) .00
Survey of Economic Opportunity (11) -.02
Michigan Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (8) .01
Year




Source:H. Gregg Lewis, Union Relative Wage Effects: A Survey.
University of Chicago Press, forthcoming. (Chapter 7, page 9 in manu-
script form). These calculations give the log differential in union effect
in the various studies.43
Table5: Coefficients and Standard Errors for Effect of Unionism on the Log of
Average Hourly Earnings of Male and Female Workers, by Sector, and Collar,
1973 and 1983
1973 1983
Mate Female Male Female
Private .17 .17 .16 .15
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Public .10 .13 .04 .10
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.02)
WhiteCollar .03 .15 .03 .14
(.02) (.01) (.02) (.02)
Blue Collar .20 .17 .18 .17
(.01) (.01) (.02) (.01)
Source:Calculated from May 1973 and May 1983 Current Population Survey
tapes.
Based on multivariate regressions which include dummy variables for
the education, age, and region of residence of workers, anô for one
digit industry and occupation.44
Table 6: Coefficients and Standard Errors for Effect of Unionism on Logof





WhiteCollar -.04(.03) .08(.03) .12
Blue Collar .27(.02) .29(.04) .02
Public
White Collar .08(.04) .20(.03) .12
Blue Collar .14(.05) .23(.07) .09
Source: Calculated using the same model as in Table 5.45
Table 7: Coefficients and Standard Errors, Estimates of the Effect of Unions on
Turnover and Employment Growth, California Establishments, 1974-1980
Ethnic Sex GroupGrowth of New Hires Promotion Termination
Employment Rate Rate Rate
Share
WhiteFemales .000(.003) -.021(.029) .004(.009) -.O11(.018)
White Males .003(.003) -.021(.018) -.008(.013) -.004(.026)
Hispanic Females -.001(.002) .023(.070) .005(.025) -.001(.049)
Hispanic Males -.003(.002) .016(.032) .018(.015) .002(.028)
Black Females -.000(.001) .103(.123) .055(.031) .069(.098)
Black Males .001(.001) .119(.109) .057(.035) .056(.068)
Source:Estimated from CaliforniaEstablishment Data Set, as described in Leonard1986.
Allequations include 17 industry dummies, 5 region dummies, and 7 year
dummies, and variates for growth rate of total employment during year of
observation; proportion of blue-collar (craft, operatives, labor, service)
workers in previous years work force; total establishment employment and
its square; and an indicator for whether the establishment was part of a
multi-establishment company; sample size = 558 establisgments for new
hires, promotions and terminations, 693 establishments for employment
share.46
Table 8:Interactions between Unions and Affirmative Action N=1273
White BlackHispanic White Black Hispanic
Males Males Males FemalesFemales Females
Union(U) -.231 3.04 -4.97 1.11 .41 -1.34
-.010 .506 -.260 .107 .147 - .127
(.101) (.135) (.115) (.1550(.154) (.173)
Contract (C) 5.61 1.57 -2.20 .97 .58 -.76
.242 .261 -.115 .093 .207 - .072
(.070) (.094) (.080) (.108)(.107) (.120)
Review (R) 1.83 1.56 .038 1.13 .62 .77
.079 .260 .0020 .109 .223 .073
(.063) (.085) (.072) (.097) (.097) (.108)
U xC 2.39 -1.97 4.34 -.080 -.16 -1.44
.103 -.328 .227 -.008 -.058 -.136
(.112) (.150) (.128) (.172) (.171) (.192)
U xR -3.67 -.25 1.20 .104 -.42 -.95
-.158 -.042 .063 .010 -.151 -.090




In nonunion plants .056 .106 -.022 .010 .006 -.008




In nonunion plants .018 .016 .0004 .011 .006 .008
In union plants-.018 .013 .012 .012 .002 -.002
Note: The dependent variable is share of 1980 blue-collar employment.
The first line is 100 "dP/dX" evaluated at mean P. The second is the
coefficient from the log-odd equation. The third is the standard error.
All equations include 20 industry, and 5 region dummies along with controls
for establishment size, growth, and structure; and 1974 employment share.
Estimated from California Establishment data as described in Leonard 1985.